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The Alternative for Germany entered into the Bundestag for the first time in September 2017 as a 
far right-wing party that garners most of its support from its opposition to Chancellor Merkel's 
"open door" policy for migrants. It has been described by the media and other parties as a right-
wing populist party based on its ideologies and statements made by party leadership. This 
classification may be too broad due to the newness of the party and the extensive definitions for 
populism. This paper seeks to determine what type of party the AID can be classified as by 
laying out a standard definition of populism, and comparing the AID to the French National 
Front and the Freedom Party of Austria, two major right-wing populist parties in Europe. 
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Process Analysis: 
I first began writing my paper at the beginning of the 2018 spring semester. I struggled with 
finding a topic for quite some time. I knew I wanted to write a research paper that combined 
some aspects of journalism (my major) and European politics (my minor), but I wasn't sure how 
to integrate the two. Then as I was browsing through the news one day, I saw all kinds of 
headlines saying that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AID) party had entered into the 
Bundestag for the first time in September 2017. As I read further, I learned that this party had 
strong anti-immigrant and anti-Euro sentiments, a trend that can be found all over Europe, but 
had not been seen so strongly in Germany since the time of the Nazis. Not only was it surprising 
that a party with these ideologies would emerge in Germany, it was also surprising how quickly 
the party rose to power, because the party was founded in 2013. 
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I decided this would be a great topic for my paper. It was current both in the news and in 
European politics. My next step was to determine what to focus on. My initial idea was to write 
about how the party rose to power, and what factors allowed it to enter into the German political 
arena. When I met with my thesis advisor, he suggested going in a different direction to make the 
paper less of a history on the AID. Because the party was so new and grew in popularity so 
rapidly, there was a lot of debate about what to label the party as. The AID is described as a 
right-wing populist party in the media; however there is a lot of debate among scholars as to 
whether the party can actually be defined as populist. So, I decided to take my advisor' s advice 
and focus on the typology of the AID. 
My advisor also suggested I make the paper a comparative paper using other well-known 
populist actors in Europe to help determine if the AID is in fact populist. My next step was to 
choose what parties to use. After doing extensive research online, I selected the French National 
Front and the Freedom Party of Austria to compare the AID to, because both parties had been 
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around for a long time and were widely defined as right-wing populists. After selecting the two 
parties to compare the AID to, I delved into my research. I found books, journals, government 
documents and websites, and credible journalistic sources about populism and far-right parties in 
Europe. My advisor also helped me find several credible sources to use. The research part of my 
paper took up the bulk of my time. Once I felt like I had enough information on what populism 
is, and the three parties I selected, I began writing my paper. 
This paper was different from any other paper I have written before. I am not unfamiliar 
with writing long papers on political parties, but I have never created a hypothesis about some 
aspect of a party, and then set out to prove my idea through detailed analysis. Most of the papers 
I had previously written were more so historical chronologies about the party. 
Writing a comparative party was also new for me, and by far the most challenging aspect 
of the paper. It was necessary to use the other two political parties for comparison to give the 
reader a base for what a right-wing populist party looks like today in Europe. The difficult part 
was weaving those two parties into the analysis in a way that didn'tjust make it look like they 
were thrown in randomly. Writing a comparative paper taught me how to intertwine related yet 
separate concepts in a way that added support to my thesis. 
Being a journalist, I am use to having to curate facts. I really had to apply that skill with 
this paper. My research presented many different opinions on how to even define "populism" 
itself, as weii as how to apply it to political parties today. Through ail the research I did, I found 
the most widely accepted definition of populism, and was able to apply that when I began to 
define the party type of the AID. 
Another challenge of this paper was determining how exactly to analyze the typology 
of the AID, and what sources to use for my analysis. I knew I needed to analyze several party 
documents, but the analyzation needed to go beyond that in order to give the reader an all-
encompassing view ofthe ideologies of the party. That is when I decided to also look into the 
AID's online and in-person presence. This made determining if the AID was in fact populist 
difficult, because the AID presents itself differently in its official party business and on its more 
unofficial platforms. Looking at all of the AID's political programs and platforms helped me 
learn how to sort out contradictory information within a political party, and how to correctly 
relay and analyze its programs and ideologies. 
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This paper is a great start for anyone looking into how they can analyze the typology 
of a political party using a comparative paper perspective. I believe it shows the benefits of using 
a comparative paper when analyzing a specific political party, and gives good aspects of what 
platforms to analyze. My findings are slightly different than that of other scholarly articles on the 
AID, because of the comparative nature of the paper and the sources I chose to analyze. Ifl had 
the opportunity to further expand on this paper, I would like to focus more on the social media 
use of the AID and how voters are engaging in their social media as a new way of expression. 
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Introduction: 
In the European elections of 2014, the electoral performance of the "populist parties" reached 
new heights. The French National Front gained 24 seats, and the Freedom Party of Austria won 
two extra MPs compared to 2009 for a total of 18 members. 1 The newest "populist" party in 
Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AID), entered into the European Parliament for the first 
time, winning seven seats. The surge in popularity of populist parties is a growing trend in 
Europe. The problems with the management of the euro, the sovereign debt crisis by the EU, and 
issues on immigration have resulted in a lack of cohesion among Europeans, causing more and 
more Europeans to reject the EU and turn toward far-right parties that are Eurosceptic and 
nationalistic.2 Today, a majority of European countries have at least one successful populist 
party: In one-third of the countries, a populist party is among the three largest parties in terms of 
votes won.3 
Populism has become the main analytical category for far-right parties that envelope an 
ideology that rejects immigration, favors the restorance of national sovereignty over a 
community with the EU, and favors the idea of unity over pluralism.4 Radical right parties have 
been gaining momentum since the 1970s, and have been challenging the old cleavages of the 
political systems, such as the opposition between the center and periphery, church versus state, 
and labor versus capital.5 With new parties such as the AID, it can be difficult to determine what 
1 European Parliament. Results of the 2014 European Elections- Results by Country- Germany-
European Parliament. 2014. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-
de-2014.html. 
2 Lazaridis, Gabriella, and Giovanna Campani. Understanding the Populist Shift: Othering in a Europe in 
Crisis, 2-3. London: Routledge, 2017. 
3 Mudde, Cas, and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 2nd ed., 52. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017. 
4 Lazard is and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 14. 
5 Pauwels, Teun. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 1. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2014. 
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kind of party it is because of its diversity, both ideologically and in its ability to get and keep 
voters, and its newness in the political arena. 
How can a political party be categorized as populist? The term "populist" has been used 
by the media too broadly. The way it is used suggests that "populist" refers to all politicians that 
oppose the neo-liberal economic model. Populist propaganda combines and integrates form and 
context, meaning it targets specific audiences and adapts to specific contexts.6 Ilvio Diamanti, an 
Italian sociologist, said that the word "populism" itself does not define, but evokes.7 It is difficult 
to have a unique definition of populism when categorizing populist parties due to the 
heterogeneity of each movement. There are far-right opposition parties, like the National Front, 
which are not in national government and are excluded from power. This is because in France, 
mainstream parties reject political collaboration with extreme right parties that appear too closely 
linked with fascism. On the other side of the spectrum, there are parties in government, like the 
Freedom Party of Austria, which have great power in parliament.8 The.FPO is currently in 
government as a coalition partner of the OVP.9 
It was once thought that populist parties could only be successful in the opposition, but 
may have difficulties once in government. Now, in a general sense, populist parties are seen as 
more resilient, and are increasingly more anchored in contemporary party systems.10 The AID 
reflects this general trend. It is the most successful newcomer in German party politics in 
6 Lazardis and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 3-4. 
7 1bid, 13. 
8 lbid, 2. 
9 Hilary Clarke, Hilary, Stephanie Halasz, and Judith Vonberg. "Coalition Government with Far-right Party 
Takes Power in Austria." CNN. Last modified December 18, 2017. 
htt ps://www .en n. com/2017/12/18/ europe/austria-government -inti/index. htm I. 
10 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe, 2. 
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recorded history, even though they did not enter parliament in the 2013 elections. 11 The AID is 
challenging the established party system in Germany. It has provided a new political platform for 
Eurosceptic sentiments to be expressed. 12 So what kind of political phenomena is the AID? Is it a 
challenger party, there to upset the norm, a protest party who entered the scene to argue against 
certain issues, or a true populist party? With the AID being fairly new in the political scene in 
both Germany and Europe, it can be difficult to analyze the typology of the party. The party 
appeals both to right-wing extremists and people who are simply dissatisfied with the status quo. 
It has taken support from all of Germany's mainstream parties. The categorization ofthe AID as 
a right-wing populist party has been a big point of contention both among scholars and the party 
itself. 13 Although it has tried to avoid the right-wing populist label, the party tends to be grouped 
with parties such as the Freedom Party of Austria and the French National Front, two European 
political parties that are clearly right-wing populists. 
The German version of populism is both generic and specific. It denounces the elites and 
the established parties, while speaking for the Volk (German word meaning both the people and 
ethno-culturally defined nation). German populists attack the mainstream media, and make use 
of their social media. 14 The rise of the AID and its ability to steer clear of any Nazi connotations 
is unusual, and a significant development for European politics. 15 Based on the content of the 
AID's 2014 European election manifesto, resolutions, online presence, and language used during 
debates, I would argue that the AID does not appear to be as populist when analyzing its official 
11 D'Ottavio, Gabriele, and Thomas Saalfeld. Germany After the 2013 Elections: Breaking the Mould of 
Post-Unification Politics?, 169. London: Routledge, 2016. 
12 Ibid, 182. 
13 Decker, Frank. "The "Alternative for Germany": Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New 
Right-Wing Populist Party." German Politics and Society 34, no. 119 (Summer 2016), 4. 
14 Ash, Timothy G. "It's the Kultur, Stupid." The New York Review of Books, December 7, 2017. 
15 Arzheimer, Kai. "The AfD : Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for 
Germany?" West European Politics 38, no. 3 (2015), 540. doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230. 
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party content, but could be classified as a nationalistic, right-wing populist party similar to the 
FPO and FN when looking at its more unofficial platforms. 
The Setting of the Party: 
The AID was formed in 2013 by a group of disaffected CDU and FDP members as an anti-EU 
party who objected to bailouts for countries in debt, like Greece. The AID should not be 
considered a splinter party from the CDU, because the founding members were recruited from a 
broader center-right background, as well as university professors (all of whom are economists), 
entrepreneurs, and a former state chair of the FDP. 16 Over time, the strongest appeal for the party 
has become its anti-immigrant stance, especially toward migrants from Muslim countries. 
Germany has received over 1.5 million migrants from Middle Eastern countries since 2015. The 
party seeks to change the constitution to remove the right of an individual to a hearing in asylum 
cases, deport immigrants whose applications to remain in Germany are rejected, and seal the 
EU's borders. The AID supports the "traditional nuclear family model," and is typically 
described as a far-right wing party with ethnic and racist nationalistic tendencies. 17 
The AID won 4. 7 percent of the vote in the 2013 Bundestag elections, just short of the 5 
percent threshold. The CDU/CSU won 41.5 percent of the vote, up 7. 7 p~rcent since 2009.18 In 
the 2013 elections, the AID almost explicitly addressed the issue of the euro zone crisis. The 
party offered an "alternative" view for voters, suggesting Germany should not continue with 
relief efforts for the indebted European countries, and proposed the "dissolution of the euro-area 
16 Arzheimer. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?" 541. 
17 Chase, Jefferson. "AfD: What you need to know about Germany's far-right party." OW, September 24, 
2017. http://www .dw. com/ en/ afd-what -you-need-to-know-a bout -ge rma nys-far -right-party/ a-
37208199. 
18 D'Ottavio and Saalfeld. Germany After the 2013 Election, 1. 
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into smaller, economically more homogeneous parts." 19 The AID was only slightly behind the 
more established FDP, and may eventually become the CDU/CSU's main competitor on the 
right. ln the May 2014 European Parliament elections, the AID polled 7 percent of the national 
German vote, more than twice the number of votes cast for the FDP.20 The AID entered the 
Bundestag on September 24, 2017 as the third largest party, taking 13 percent of the national 
vote. The party's main stronghold is in the former communist East Germany, where it won 20 
percent ofthe vote in the 2016 regional elections. The AID's main appeal to voters is its 
opposition to Merkel's open-door policy toward migrants.21 
The AID has taken an economically liberal position and is in favor of stricter immigration 
rules.22 Opposition to a continuation of German financial aid to EU member states affected by 
the debt crisis was the single most important explanatory factor of vote choice for the AID in 
2013. A mix of economic liberalism and social conservatism may be helping the AID attract 
votes .from different subsections of the electorate.23 The AID is a "responsive policy seeker," 
taking over issues that are neglected by the mainstream parties. The party mobilizes voter 
sentiments against the way traditional parties deal with the public- and how they managed the 
economic crisis - rather than appealing to their own programs.24 The anti-euro issue and 
critiquing of the Eurozone crisis management could have made the AID a one-issue party, but 
the party managed to escape that fate.25 The AID is now more than just a niche party. Before, 
they were just a single issue party based on Germany's involvement in the European debt crisis. 
Now, the AID has become attractive for disappointed CDU voters who criticize Merkel's 
19 lbid, 89-90. 
20 Ibid, 3. 
21 Chase. "AfD: What you need to know about Germany's far-right party." 
22 D'Ottavio and Saalfeld. Germany After the 2013 Election, 93. 
23 Ibid, 106. 
24 1bid, 9. 
25 Ibid, 197. 
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modernization of the party' s social policies, and for disappointed FDP voters. The AID 
essentially took over the "old" issues of the mainstream parties and made that their political 
strategy.26 
The AID was initially viewed by the media and electorate as a party created by 
economics professors, entrepreneurs and ex party members, all drawn from the CDU.27 The party 
has a widespread electorate. One pollster defined the party as a "clear bourgeois party with 
center-right oriented voters." In the 2013 elections, 20 percent of votes cast for the AID were 
former FDP voters, and around 15 percent were former CDU voters. This high level of cross-
partnership shows an interesting catch-all potential: Votes were drawn from former abstainers, 
and from across the political spectrum.280ne of the last surveys conducted by Ipsos European 
Pulse showed that two out of three of people interviewed believe that Europe is going in the 
wrong direction. Seventy-seven percent of the recorded respondents were French, and 61 percent 
were German.29 According to Eurobarometer data, in Germany, trust for the EU has also 
declined over the past 5 years, as well as more distrust for the EP and the European 
Commission.30 This sentiment reflects the AID' s ideologies, as well as other right-wing populist 
party' s ideologies, such as the FPO and FN. In order to understand if the AID is in fact populist, 
and to compare it to the populism seen in the FPO and FN, a cohesive definition of populism 
must be found. 
26 1bid, 168. 
27 1bid, 189. 
28 Ibid, 193. 
29 Lazardis and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 189. 
30 D'Ottavio and Saalfeld. Germany After the 2013 Election, 188. 
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What is Populism? 
First, "populism" must be defined to base the typology of the AID. Populism can have different 
meanings in different countries, creating confusion as to how to define the term. In the European 
context, populism refers to anti-immigration and xenophobia, whereas in Latin America it is 
considered more in the context of clientelism and economic management. 31 
The Laclauan approach to populism, current to studies in Western European politics, 
states that "liberal democracy is the problem and radical democracy is the solution." In this 
approach, populism is considered a liberalizing force. By reintroducing conflict into politics and 
appealing to sequestered sectors of society with the goal of changing the status quo, populism 
can help achieve radical democracy.32 Another approach considers populism as a way for leaders 
and parties to mobilize the masses. This theory hints at the use of crude political language and 
behavior to attract attention from the media and gain popular support. These actors can use 
populism to appeal to the people and oppose the elite.33 
For the purposes of this analysis, I will use Cas M udde' s definition of populism, which is 
widely accepted among most academics. Mudde describes populism as: 
"a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people " versus "the corrupt elite, " and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. "34 
31 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 2. 
32 lbid, 3. 
33 lbid, 4. 
34 1bid, 6. 
II 
Thin-centered ideologies are often restricted and attach to other ideologies. Because ofthis, 
the formation of "subtypes" of populism is enabled. 35 Populism has three interrelated 
characteristics: An emphasis on "the" people; anti-elitist connotations; and exclusivity. The 
people are seen as a monolithic and homogeneous entity. Different individuals and groups are 
excluded from the ideal notion of"the people." The elites are seen as obstructions to the 
centrality of the will of the people.36 Many populists argue that the elite are not only ignoring the 
interests of the people, but are working against the interests of the country. Within the EU, many 
populist parties argue that the political elite are putting the interests of the EU over the member 
states. The FPO, for example, will regularly criticize the media for defending "the elite" and not 
treating the FPO fairly. 37 Populists are not only hostile to elites, but are hostile toward 
individuals or groups ("others") who are not part of what the populists consider "the people."38 
Appealing to the general will is useful to a political party, because it can create different 
demands and identify a common enemy. It enables the "formation of a popular subject with a 
strong identity ('the people'), which is able to challenge the status quo ('the elite')." In this way, 
populism can be seen as a democratizing force because it empowers groups that do not feel 
represented by the government.39 In terms of the AID, the party takes the "popular subject" of 
immigration, identifies a "common enemy," (that person being Angela Merkel for allowing a 
large number of refugees into Germany), and challenges both Merkel and the European Union. 
Populism allows for and legitimizes authoritarianism and attacks on anyone who may 
threaten the homogeneity of the people.40 So how is populism different from neo-fascism or neo-
35 1bid. 
36 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe, Appendix A. 
37 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 13. 
38 Refer to 35. 
39 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 18. 
40 Ibid. 
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Nazism? Neo-fascists and neo-Nazi groups re-elaborate their heritage of the past. Neo-Nazi and 
neo-liberal fascist parties cannot be defined as populist, because their aim is at regime change. 
Populist parties accept representative democracy and its tools, and use strong verbal violence in 
elections, but reject violence.41 
With populism, there is a shift from biological racism to cultural racism, where 
arguments against immigration are no longer based on racial differences, but on the collective 
loss of identity and the extra financial burden immigrants bring.42 This type of populism links to 
nationalism. Populist nationalism "not only excludes others, but in fact rejects all forms of 
pluralism and difference in the community of the people, relegating all uncertainties or conflicts 
beyond the borders of the nation state."43 This creates a discourse of 'othering' by far right-wing 
parties. Some examples of "others" include "Islamic invasion", Islamophobia, European Union, 
and the elite. These groups are all seen as a potential threat to society. This leads to the right-
wing populist discourse across all of Europe: Nationalism, racism, gender inequality, sexism, and 
homophobia.44 Right-wing populist parties construct arguments based on these concepts that 
create an "other" and a normalized "we." 
Because of its thin-centered ideologies, populism attaches itself to other ideological concepts 
that seem relevant to populist actors, the most popular being agrarianism, nationalism, 
neoliberalism, and socialism.45 Left-wing populists combine populism with some form of 
socialism, while right-wing populists combine it with some form of nationalism.46 There are 
three different types of populism seen on both sides of the political spectrum; -the populist radical 
41 Lazardis and Giovanna. Understanding the Populist Shift, 179. 
42 1bid, 5. 
43 lbid, 6. 
44 lbid, 8. 
45 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 19. 
46 lbid, 21. 
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right; social populists; and neoliberal populist parties. The first group contains the "prophets" 
who focus on the new issue of immigration, while the latter two are "purifiers" who claim to 
defend the "real" socialist or neoliberal values that have been betrayed by the establishment.47 
Neoliberal populism takes on the beliefs of classical liberal beliefs in values such as 
individualism, (negative) freedom, a minimal state, and the free market. When combined with 
populism, neoliberals argue that individual liberties both in the private and public sphere are 
under attack by the establishment. The aim of this type of party is to diminish big government 
and state intervention, while simultaneously defending the "ordinary people" against the "corrupt 
elite." Social populism combines populism with democratic socialism, a left-wing ideology 
between reform and revolution. Social populist parties have fused democratic socialism with an 
appeal to the ordinary people (the working class) against economic and political elites.48 
National populism is ethnic nationalism combined with xenophobia. Ethnic nationalism 
is the idea that the nation and the state should coincide, and persons and ideas that are not native 
to the state are fundamentally a threat for the homogenous state. Only people with the state's 
ethnic affiliation should be able to control the state. In order to not appear overly racist, national 
populists argue that ethnic groups are "equal but different," and are so different from the native 
population that they are unable to assimilate. Because certain groups cannot be integrated into 
society, they present a fundamental threat to the values, way of life, and cultural integrity of the 
nation. In addition to the anti-elitism within populism, national populists argue that the 
government should stop imposing "multicultural dreams." National populist parties also feature 
authoritarianism in their ideologies. They advocate for law and order and a return to traditional 
47 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe, 3. 
48 1bid, 22-24. 
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values.49 National populists are in favor of returning power to the nation states and regaining 
power from supranational institutions like the European Union. Their idea of sovereignty is 
linked to the notion of rebuilding a "homogeneous society" based on ethnicity, giving priority to 
"nationals" over migrants. This form of ethno-nationalism is legitimized as a form of patriotism 
and is not limited to issues only on migration. During the Eurozone debt crisis, German parties 
wanted to impose austerity policies on Southern European countries, pitting the "national 
interests" of the "virtuous" Germans over those in the South.50 
Populism can be merged with nationalism when the distinction between the people and 
the elite is both moral and ethnic. This is not as prevalent among xenophobic populist parties in 
Europe, due to the fact that the elite are most likely "natives." Xenophobic populists in Europe 
define the people in ethnic terms, referring to immigrants and minorities as "aliens," while 
arguing that although the elites are natives, they favor the interests of the immigrants over their 
own native people. 51 
Many of the successful populist parties in Europe started out as non-populist parties. The 
FPO started out as a non-populist party, although it had populist factions. It transformed into a 
populist radical right party after the election of party leaders Jorg Haider. Many populist parties 
survive the "founder-leader," even if they go through periods of electoral decline and weak 
leadership. Some parties move from one strong leader to the next, such as with the FN (from 
Jean-Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen) and the FPO (from Haider to Heinz-Christian Strache).52 
In addition to using ideas of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia, the FN and the FPO use 
49 lbid, 25. 
50 Lazardis and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 180-183. 
51 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 14. 
52 Ibid, 55. 
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authoritarianism in their ideologies. These new populist parties are hierarchically structured, and 
often have a charismatic leader. This was especially the case with the FP0.53 
A Brief Look into the Populist Makeup ofthe FPO and the FN 
The FPO was founded as a follow-up Nazi party and developed into a neo-populist right-wing 
party that nurtured relationships with far-right and Nazi organizations. 54 The erosion of the social 
partnership between the SPO and FPO, the proportional system, and the structural weakening of 
Austria's two-party system created an opportunity for the FPO to reform itself as a right-wing 
populist party. Haider modernized the party toward a party of the "New Right," and subsequently 
in the direction of a right-wing populist party. He created a division between "rightest, neo-Nazi, 
veteran organizations and revanchist groups and the FPO." This made it so right-wing extremist 
groups and organizations remained, but the FPO and its officials could not be directly labeled as 
revanchist or anti-Semitist. This reformation recreated the FPO as a right-wing radical party 
under neoliberal conditions, while still keeping the Nazi tradition alive. Haider often maked 
"coded" reference to Nazi ideology, but wanted to appeal to a broader electorate, Haider 
mobilized voters based on ethnic and nationalistic discourses. The type of populism employed by 
the FPO included the transformation of the party toward an authoritarian, leader-oriented party 
through organizational reforms, which in turn strengthened Haider's leadership. 55 
Haider's political strategy included criticizing and challenging the political elite of the 
SPO and OVP, and replacing his ideas of Nazism and anti-Semitism with resentment and racist 
rhetoric toward immigrants. He mobilized the idea of"the people" against the normalized 
"other," whom he thought were posing a threat to Austrian workers and to the security of the 
53 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe, 16. 
54 Lazardis and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 33. 
55 Ibid, 36. 
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country. Haider's populism established a new sense of"the people" being betrayed by the elites, 
and antagonism against immigrants. The party bases its strategy on racist claims and ethnic 
identity politics, with less emphasis on interest politics, by promoting the inequality of people 
based on culture or ethnicity. The FPO only rallied as anti-EU after Austria's accession in 1995. 
Haider's anti-EU stance was combined with a neo-liberal agenda of opposing welfare benefits, 
while at the same time promising social benefits. 56 Haider's racist, anti-immigrant mobilization 
influenced other government parties, and had a significant impact on immigration policies and on 
security issues, in effect tightening asylum laws. While the FPO is not an all-out Nazi party, it 
could be seen as a "silent" organizer for neo-Nazi and extremist organizations. The FPO can be 
seen as both a right-wing populist party on the one hand, and a neo-Nazi group organizer on the 
other.57 
The National Front is a prototypical populist radical right party. The FN pitted itself 
against the four established parties of the time. The FN was founded with a broad variety of far 
right groups and held together exclusively by the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. The party 
reformed its image under Marine Le Pen, and the FN has almost quadrupled its leadership since 
she took over as party leader in 2011. The power structure of the FN is extremely centralized. 58 
The progression of the National Front in the 1980s brought about debates as to whether fascism 
had made a comeback in France, or if the party was something new that needed to be defined. 59 
Some classify the National Front as being "national populist" to differentiate the party from 
fascists.60 
56 Ibid, 37. 
57 Ibid, 38-39. 
58 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction, 53. 
59 Lazardis and Giovanna, Understanding the Populist Shift, 31. 
60 Ibid, 4. 
17 
In France, the discourse toward immigration has become more ambiguous, where far-
right parties are trying to accuse capitalist immigration politics and globalization instead of the 
migrants themselves; differentiating the difference between "good" migrants and "bad" ones; 
and moving the integration border. Now, the FN even portrays migrants as victims.61 The FPO, 
on the other hand, frames immigration as a potential threat to the 'homeland,' or Austrian 
society. One member of the FPO said that wearing a scarf is not included "in Islam," and is 
therefore just a "political symbol." The threat of Islam has become the main issue, and the 
threatening "other." The portrayal of the Muslims as "menaces to society" looms over European 
security and identity. 
Analysis of the Party Classification of the AID: 
In order to determine what type of party the AID is, I will analyze its 2014 European election 
manifesto, resolutions, online presence, and leadership comments. The AID dropped the image 
of the single-issue party about six months after the 2013 state elections by broadening their 
programmatic profile.62 After entering the European Parliament, the AID did its best to enter into 
the conservative parliamentary group made up mostly of British Tory MEPs and representatives 
from the Polish Law and Justice Party, but did not succeed. Although the party tries to avoid 
right-wing populist parties, it tends to get grouped in with them based off their comments in 
political debates and other statements.63 One such remark can be found in an email sent by Alice 
Weidel in 2013 that states that "the reason we are inundated by culturally alien [kulturfremden] 
peoples such as Arabs, Sinti and Roma etc. is the systematic destruction of civil society as a 
61 Ibid, 55-57. 
62 Arzheimer. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?" 542. 
63 Decker. "The "Alternative for Germany": Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-
Wing Populist Party," 4. 
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possible counterweight to the enemies-of-the-constitution by whom we are ruled. These pigs are 
nothing other than puppets of the victor powers of the Second World War. ... " This email is just 
one example of evidence of AID leaders' xenophobic, right-wing nationalist views.64 
The party's political manifestos are fairly moderate in comparison to the AID leader's 
speech. They do share the European right-wing populist demand for more direct participation 
based on the Swiss model. The party is economically liberal with conservative social positions. 
This brand of national populism defends the wealth and economic standing ofthe nation, 
producing a product that emphasizes the superiority of the German national economic model 
over other nations. The manifestos present a strong position of a free market that separates the 
AID from other European right-wing populist parties, which tend to exude more economically 
leftist positions, yet they seem themselves as defending the welfare systems from migrants who 
want to "freeload."65 The AID does play greatly upon "identity politics," within their manifestos, 
along with family, gender, and immigration policies that favor a more populist appeal. The 
AID's official programmatic agenda, those being the political guidelines and party manifestos 
for the German and European elections, have a more economically liberal tone due to the initial 
dominance of the liberal wing within the party leadership. 
The 2014 European election manifesto is the AID's first full-length policy document. The 
15 most frequent concepts in the manifesto are "member states," "Eurozone," "ECB," and 
institutions." None of these words are among the top priorities of any other German party. 
Although Lucke has claimed the party is neither left or right, the party's manifesto places it at the 
far right of the political spectrum, to the right of the CDU and FDP, but to the left of the NPD 
64 Ash. "It's the Kultur, Stupid." 
65 Decker. "The "Alternative for Germany": Factors Behind its Emergence and Profiie of a New Right-
Wing Populist Party," 5. 
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(Based on a scale using version 1.3 of Slap in and Proksch' s wordfish package for the R 
statistical system). The AID is prone to displaying national symbols and emphasizing German's 
national interests. The slogan "Mut zu Deutschland" (translated roughly to "Dare to stand by 
Germany) was the title ofthe party's manifesto and its main slogan for the EP 2014 campaign. It 
is also used prominently on the party's website, social media profiles, and other party material. 
The sections regarding policies within European Institutions and immigration have a rather 
modest tone. The party believes Germany should have a greater say within European institutions, 
and blames other member states for breaking treaties. In terms of immigration, the AID supports 
a point-based immigration system for non-EU citizens, and supports the principles of free 
movement and free choice of residence for all EU citizens.66 These positions do not appear to be 
overly nationalistic or nativist in nature. 
Judging the AID by its manifesto, the party cannot be categorized as a Radical Right or 
populist party. The manifesto does not contain any references to "the elite," "political classes," 
or the "eurocrats." There are no hints of the use of populism that appeals to emotions, 
oversimplification, or opportunism. There is also no evidence within the manifesto that would 
suggest the AID has a "thin ideology" like most populist parties. The AID is highly critical of 
Brussels and the German mainstream parties. They blame the banks for the ongoing financial 
crisis, and call for more regulation of the banks. The AID wants the EU to hold referendums on 
future enlargements, as well as important decisions on the euro.67 
Resolutions adopted by the AID parliamentary group in its constituent meeting in 
September 2017 also contain fairly moderate content. The first of the resolutions set out to 
"finally stop migration chaos." From fall 2015-16, Germany spent about 50 billion euros on 
66 Arzheimer. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?" 544-
545. 
67 lbid, 546. 
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migration costs. It called for the closing of German borders to migrants, and to reject 
applications from arrivals from neighboring states. This resolution calls for Germany to reject all 
types of resettlement plans and the suppression of family reunification from areas that are no 
longer "directly or not directly contested." The AID fears that the influx of immigration could 
shake the cultural and economic peace in Germany. The second resolution is called the "Euro 
Memorandum," and is based off the condemnation of Macron's "World Government 
Declaration." The French President Emmanuel Macron wanted to abolish Europe's 
"reestablishment," and thus Germany's financial and state sovereignty in favor of a centralized 
liability and transfer union. The AID argued against this plan in favor of more national 
responsibility to create a sound financial and economic policy. The third referendum created by 
the AID was direct democracy according to the Swiss Model. This referendum stated that 
citizens should not only vote for the Bundestag every four years, but should be able to participate 
directly in political decisions at the federal level at any time. This would require a constitutional 
amendment in Germany. They said that they "want to give the people the right to initiate their 
own laws and to change or override laws passed by parliament" and to close the gap in 
democracy.68 
The lack of populist content in the AID's European election manifesto and resolutions 
can be misleading. To view the party from all platforms, it is necessary to analyze the AID's 
presence on the internet. The pages analyzed on the website contain comments on media reports, 
current events or document statements by prominent party leaders. "AID" (573), "Alternative" 
(338), and "Deutschland" (531) are among the five most popular stem words. The AID's website 
has a clearly right-wing populist tone. About 40 percent of the references to "Germany" are used 
68 AfD. "Resolutionen Der Bundestagsfraktion Der Alternative Fur Deutschland." AfD Kompakt. Last 
modified September 29, 2017. https://afdkompakt.de/2017 /09/28/resolutionen-der-fraktion-der-
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in regards to things outside the party's name. The party talks a lot about Germany, German 
(253), Europe (379), the euro (327), the EU (175), and the Eurozone (62). The tone of the 
website is a bit harsher than that of the manifesto. There is the occasional attack on the ECJ and 
refugees who "abuse the right to hospitality." Because there are no interactive elements on the 
website, the party's main way to interact with members, supporters, the media, and the general 
public is through social media platforms. 
The AID's strongest presence is on Facebook.69 As of April 2018, the AID had over 
397,000 likes on its official page, more than twice as much as the CDU (180,000) and the SPD 
(about 187,000). In short, the AID uses its Facebook page to direct viewer's attention to news 
articles that support the party's positions, curate stories on issues that will vibe with the party's 
supporters, and sometimes poke fun at political opponents. More populist rhetoric can be found 
on the Facebook page than on the main party website. The "elites" are hardly ever mentioned, 
but there are frequent references to conflict between "politicians" and "citizens," as well as calls 
for protecting "freedom" and "democracy." The party anthem of the AID is one of the posts on 
the Facebook page. It says "Germans are a "really super people" who nonetheless "suffer," 
Chancellor Merkel is accused of treating "us" like a bunch of"right-less monkeys," while 
politicians more generally are guilty of writing incomprehensible and self-serving laws. The only 
solution to this crisis is to vote for the AID." The anthem suggests populist rhetoric of the 
"other" versus the "we." Supporters of the AID are allowed to post their own content, as well as 
comment on posts created by the AID. These posts tend to reflect nationalistic and populist 
sentiment in more ways than what the AID themselves are posting. Typically, the posts are about 
"ungrateful immigrants, privileged homosexuals, and greedy politicians." Even though this kind 
69 Arzheimer. "The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?" 547-
548. 
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of speech is tolerated, racist slurs and common expletives are rare. This could be due to 
interventions by the party to keep that kind of language off their page. The AID does claim that it 
actively monitors the page and deletes racist or illegal content; however that can be difficult to 
prove. There is no way of knowing how many items have been posted and then deleted. 70 
Electoral campaigns take on a different tone from the manifesto, referendums, website 
and social media. Topics of national identity paired with xenophobic positions and a strong anti-
establishment rhetoric were promoted, especially in Eastern Germany. Voters showed in the 
2013 elections that the AID's hard-lined stance against immigration in Germany was a stronger 
reason for their success than the Euroskeptic positions seen in their manifesto. During the 2014 
European elections, power shifted from the economically liberal wing of the AID to the national-
conservative wing due mostly to the Eurozone crisis. The rightward movement of the party was 
reinforced by the fact that the next elections after the federal and European elections were in East 
German states in summer of2014. The party's success in the East was taken as confirmation that 
the party should continue moving toward a ring-wing course.71 The refugee crisis catapulted the 
AID to new heights. The party grew to be the new voice of protest for the people who protested 
the large influx of migrants entering Germany. The reformation of the country's asylum laws and 
criticism of the chancellor by her own party also played into the AID's hands. In state elections 
in Baden-Wiirttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate in March of2016, the AID received 15.1 and 
12.6 percent of the vote respectively, securing its first double-digit results in a western state. In 
Saxony-Anhalt, it received the highest share of the vote ever obtained by a right-wing populist or 
extremist party in state elections, winning 24.2 percent of the vote. Once voter defections from 
existing parties are taken into account, results show that just under half of the AID's voters in 
70 Ibid, 550. 
71 Decker. "The "Alternative for Germany": Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-
Wing Populist Party," 6-8. 
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both Baden-Wiirttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate and more than half in Saxony-Anhalt used to 
call the left-of-center camp home. The party also benefits from defections by non-extremist 
voters from the center-right camp who felt abandoned by CDU's shift to the left.72 
Conclusion: 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the AID can be categorized as a right-wing populist 
party. Based off my findings, I would argue it can be classified as a nationalist, right-wing 
populist party in some manners, and a more moderate right-wing party in others. An analysis of 
its official party business- its 2014 European election manifesto and resolutions- shows the 
AID can be considered a moderate right-wing party based on its programs. There are no 
outlandish demands in either of these that could be considered populist. No references to the 
"people" or the "elite," the most general concepts found in populist ideologies, can be found in 
either of the documents. Neither the European election manifesto nor the resolutions appear to 
suggest the AID has a thin-centered ideology, another main criterion for populist parties. The 
language used in these documents does not seem nationalistic or nativist in nature. The party's 
online and in-person presence, however, seems to fall in line with typical national populist 
sentiment like that seen within the FN and FPO. The website and Facebook page have a clearly 
nationalistic, nativist tone that creates an "other" and an "us." Even more national populist 
sentiment can be found in statements made by party leaders. 
Racist, xenophobic, nativist comments made by populist party leaders is a common 
thread between the FN, FPO, and AID, although the AID does not have one strong leader like the 
FN and FPO. The AID appears to be less right-wing populist than the FPO based on its overall 
party documentation, online presence, and party leadership. The type of populism seen in the 
72 lbid, 10-11. 
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AID would fall closer to the type of populism seen within the FN under Marine Le Pen, as both 
parties attempt to steer clear of typical right-wing classifications officially, but still present as 
right-wing populists within its leadership and less official pages. 
If protest sentiments against the government's current refugee policy begins to subside, 
the future of the AID could be rocky, leading to more infighting between the moderate and right-
wing camps within the AID. Even if the refugee issue subsides, however, the AID can still hold 
onto their socioculturally conservative positions and fill in other gaps in the party system that 
have been long forgotten by the CDU.73 Whether the AID will become more radical and 
nationa"Iistic in its manifestos and party program is up for debate, depending on how the party 
keeps doing electorally and how voters continue to positively perceive the party. According to 
polls conducted by six of the leading national survey collectors, the AID currently has an average 
of a 13.2 percent approval rating.14 For now, the AID can partly be classified as a nationalistic 
populist party, and partly as a moderate right-wing party. The future of the party as a prominent 
challenger to the traditional party system. is yet to be seen as new issues rise in Europe and 
Germany. 
73 1bid, 12-14. 
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